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GENDER AS A CORE VALUE: TEACHING PROPERTY

Joan C. Williams*
I have been teaching property for nearly thirty years and bring
gender to virtually every unit I teach-but in subtle ways that avoid the
potential for pushback if students think they are being taught gender not
property.
The first challenge is to open up room for the view that it is
legitimate to talk about the distribution of property as an integral part of
the property course. I do this by discussing three different visions of
property that co-exist in American law: the feudal vision, the republican
vision, and the liberal vision.' The feudal vision viewed property as
social glue, as an institution whose proper role was to transmit the
existing social hierarchy from one generation to the next.2 Underlying
this vision was the view that hierarchy was natural and desirable because
the "Great Chain of Being" ordered people's estates and that virtue
consisted in fulfilling the role proper to one's estate.3 The republican
vision, today associated with Thomas Jefferson, maintained that the
purpose of the institution of property was to preserve the republican form
of government.4 Jefferson and others believed that this is best achieved
through the widespread distribution of property because property gives
people the independence to pursue the common good rather than their
own narrow self-interest.5 Unlike the republican vision, which seeks to
design property rights to create a certain type of politics, the liberal
vision seeks to design property to achieve the economic goal of creating
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1. See CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND
USE 10-111 (4th ed. 1997).
2. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 173-80 (6th ed. 2006).
3. Joan C. Williams, The Rhetoric ofProperty,83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 290 (1998).
4. Id. at 308-26.
5. Id at 317.
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wealth.6 Because it is vital to show students how anything out of the
ordinary will actually be useful to them as lawyers, I use the three visions
to help students identify and formulate creative arguments in property
contexts where the law is vague or chaotic or when the law cuts against
their client. In this way, I turn teaching theory into teaching persuasion.
I also use the visions to explain the underlying logic of different
areas of property law. The feudal vision helps explain estates in land and
why no man can create an estate; allowing, this kind of discretion would
jeopardize the feudal goal of recreating the existing hierarchy over time.7
The republican vision, which shows up in servitudes, landlord-tenant,
and takings cases, provides students with a home-grown American
language with which to argue that property rights need to be shaped and
reshaped to achieve the common good and that concern over the
distribution of property is a legitimate concern in American law.8 When
I introduce the republican vision, I also introduce data documenting the
profound influence of gender and race in determining the distribution of
property in the United States today. By presenting the liberal vision as
one vision among others, I also attempt to de-familiarize the
commonsense notion that property law is naturally about unfettering
individuals to create the wealthiest society without regard for how that
wealth is distributed.
Beyond that basic framework, I weave a gender perspective into my
discussions of many arenas of property doctrine. In concurrent estates, I
use domestic violence examples to discuss partition and ouster; we also
discuss domestic violence in the context of takings law. In landlordtenant law, we discuss why tenants are disproportionately poor (because
women are); we also discuss whether this affects how the judges of the
landlord-tenant revolution decided the cases. (It did.) In future interests,
we talk about how the ideology of a gender hierarchy was an integral
part of the Great Chain of Being mentality behind the feudal system of
estates. In the section on real estate, we talk about why women (along
with people of color) are disproportionately affected by the foreclosure
crisis. Close analysis of a real-estate mortgage and title-insurance policy
also reveals how those documents are stacked against the individual and
opens up space for discussion about whether liberalism's promise of
protecting individual rights is realized in a society with dramatic power
6. BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 33-34, 76.
7. See id. at 10-28.
8. See id. at 28-64.
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differentials.
The most sustained discussion of gender concerns marital property.
There, we talk about how and why household work is not translated into
property rights in the context of divorce through Borelli v. Brusseau9 and
0 In Borelli, a husband promised to leave his wife
Martinez v. Martinez.1
property in return for her nursing him after he suffered a stroke; she kept
her promise, but he did not keep his." The court determined that he did
not have to leave his wife property because there was no consideration
for his promise and "spouses" owe each other a "duty of care." 2 (Does
that mean, asked the dissent, that if "Mrs. Clinton became ill, President
Clinton [would have to] drop everything and personally care for her?" 1 3)
In Martinez, a trial court made a very low award to a wife with a high
school education and three children, rejecting a much higher award and a
novel legal theory that would have valued the fact that her husband (a
doctor) could not have pursued his studies if she had not been caring for
the children.14 I end this unit by giving the students statistics on the
hours lawyers work and discussing who in the class expects to work part
time for part of their career. This is a way of 1) teaching students how to
use social science to make a point, 2) making the point that Mrs.
Martinez's situation is not a thing of the past, 3) encouraging students to
think through who is entitled to what property rights within the family,
and 4) giving them a chance to work through their anxieties about the
work-family conflicts that are commonplace in the legal profession.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647 (1993).
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 660 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
Martinez, 818 P.2d at 539.

